The People v. Clapp by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
8-31-1944
The People v. Clapp
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation










SM FAIRcttrt.i> V. 1hTh""ES [24 C.M 
Woofter, Negro Problems in Cities, ch. II, The R8.pid.-Cfity 
Growth, p. 26; Sterner, The Negro's Share, A Study of In-
come, Consumption, Housing, and Public ASMstanee, pp. 186-
209; Martin, Segregation of Negroes, 32 Mich.L.Rev. 721), 
have made it impossible for many negroes to find decent 
housing in large centers of population. The report of the 
Committee on Negro Housing of the President's Conference 
on Home Building and Home Ownership (1932) page 3, 
states: "Cities of the North . . . have shown increases 
ranging from 10 to 600 per cent. Chicago's Negro popula-
tion in 1910 was 44,103; in 1930 it had increased to 233,903. 
Philadelphia's increased from 84,459 in 1910 to 219,599 in 
1930, andthat of New York . . . from 91,709 to 327,706." 
In recent years there has been a large negro migration into 
Southern California. The censns of 1940 shows an increase 
of the colored population of Los Angeles from 67,348 in 1930 
to 97,847 (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1942, 
78th Congrcss, 1st Sess., House Document No. 53, p. 29), 
and the war has accelcrated the pace of this migration. 
Negroes migrating into urban communities have found 
barriers at every turn. " Segregation . . . has kept the 
Neero-occupied sections of cities throughout the country fa-
tally unwholesome places, a. menace to the health, morals and 
general decency of cities, and 'plague spots for race exploita-
tion, friction and riots.'" (Report of the Committee on 
Negro Housing of the President's Conference on Home Build-
ing and Home Ownership, pp. 45 and 46.) The choice lies 
between the continuation of such conditions and the expan-
sion of urban negro districts. Race restriction' agreements, 
undertaking to do what the state cannot, must yield to the 
public interest in the sound development of the whole com-
Inunity. The courts, as the agencies of the state confronted 
with the problem of enforcing racial zoning by private agree-
ments, must consider all of the factors that affect the public 
interest. It is pertinent to recall the words of Judge Cardozo 
in his concurring opinion in Adler v. Deegan, ~1 N.Y. 467, 
484 [167 N.E. 705, 711]: "The Multiple Dwelling Act is 
aimed at many evils, but most of all it is a measure to erad-
icate the slum. It seeks to bring about conditions whereby 
healthy children shall be born, and healthy men and women 
reared, in the dwellings of thc great metropolis. To have 
such men an4 WOm\lP, is not a city concern merely. It is the 
N/A 
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concern of the whole state. Here is to be bred the citizenry 
with which the State must do its work in the years that are 
to come. The end to be achieved is more than the avoidance 
of pestilence or contagion. The end to be achieved is the 
quality of men and women . . . If the moral and physical ' 
fibre of its manhood and womanhood is not a State concern, 
the question is, what is Y" . 
In the present case a residential district populated by 
colored people now surrounds the restricted area on three 
sides. The question whether the restricted area shall stand 
as a, barrier against expansion of the negro district cannot 
be determined entirely by :findings with regard to property 
values and the interests of property Gwners. It is also nec-
essary to determine whether maintenance of this barrier 
would deprive the colored population of any feasible access 
to additional housing and compress it within the inflexible 
boundaries of its present district at the risk of a congestion 
whose evils would inevitably burst the bounds of that district. 
The trial court should therefore be directed to make' findings 
as to the housing facilities available in the district occupied 
by the colored population and to determine whether there 
is a need for additional housing that would justify an. expan-
sion of the district by absorption of the restricted area. 
[Crim. No .. 4528. In Bank. Aug. 31, 1944.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. AMOS FRANKLIN CLAPP, 
et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Accomplices-Who Are.-Under 
Pen. Code, § 1111, the mere fact that a witness is pun-
ishable for cooperation with the defendant in the illegal trans-
action does not make him an accomplice. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Accomplices-Who Are.-In case of crimes 
requiring two or more persons for their commission, a specific 
provision for punishing acts of certain participantp .super-
sedes Pen. Code, § 31, subjecting such participante in the 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Criminal Law, § 574; [3] Abor-
tion, § 6. 
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crioe of an accuspd to prosecution for its eommlsst":l, witr~ 
the result that tbey arc t:ot1'.ccomplices of the accused wit!:in 
I·Cll. Cwe, § 1111. (Sec Code ('iv. Proc., § 1859.) 
[3] Aborticn-Evidence-Co.roboration.-The p<'rson submitth,g 
to ll::l. abortion, being subject to prosecution untler Pell. Cude, 
§ 275, is not .ar. accompliee of the person performiub the op-
eration mthin Pen. Code, § 1111, as amended in 1915, al,d her 
testimony, although it must be corroborated under Pen. Cnc.e, 
§ llO~, Illaybe corroborated by testimony of an accomplice. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LOtI 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Stan-
ley Musk, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for abortion. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
A. H. McConnell and Archie G. Cope for Appellant. 
Robert VI. Kenny, Attorney General, T. G. Ne!;rich and 
Fra:1k Hicharus, Deputies Attorney General, Fred N. Howser, 
District Attorney, and Jere J. Sullivan, Deputy District .At-
torney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-DefendulltH appeal from judgments con-
victing thp.t::l of the crir..le of abortion and fron an order 
der..ylng their t::lCltions for a new trial. Their cr>nvictions 
were bneec ()n the te:::tir.:J.ony of Thekla Huntley, who under-
"e~t the iller,:':lI operation, and of Alice Huntley and Allee 
Thur:::tan, her nother-in-In .... , and sister-in-law, "htl "ere 
prcser..t during the operation, which took place in Tbchaa 
Huntley's t.ome. 
Defendants attack the judgn.ents on the ground that tl,e 
evidence was insufficient to support the convicti<»nG. They 
claim. thnt 1\11 tbree ,vitnE'sses were accomplices a~ld that thci::.-
tcst1'1!!l:('ny therE'fore needed corroboration undt;r secti")n 1111 
of th.e Penal Code, whic:h provides: "A conviction cannc{ 
!le !lacl up""n tne testimony of an acc0mplire unless it Uf' e"'r-
r)borateu by such other eviclcnce as shall tend to C'Onn"d tae 
defehJ~:lt with the com~lissi()n of the offense; 8:1'1 the C4c'l"-
ru~orlltl<·1II. h. n""t suff.cient if it mp.rdy shows the C'IJ!llm~~:..-m. 
[3 J \VOt:lall on whom abortion 1~ c"~mittcd as IIcconLplic", bot", 
139 A.L.R. 91:13. Sec, also, 1 Ca1.Jur. 114; 1 Al:J..Jur. 15L 
iug.1944] pgO?:t£ tI. CLApp 
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I.e Cle ol!eose or the c;r\'O.'1.1UbLanr.es there.-l. _~ aCl)._~.bce . 
is hereby ae£neJ. IJ,S ·:tlc who id liabje to p~ltltind fr It" the 
idt,nt.icvl o[<.;llse cnargoo sgailllist the de!e~·i<UJt 6.'0 tr:1l1 in 
the ~USe in ',vhich the te5tll~ .. ny of the 8cc()J>'ti,li~ is giVOl .. " 
The court instructed the jury that the t8dt~y of ~e 
accomplice is not corroborated by t!..t.\t of a~·the.r. (l'cu,,16 
v. C"eo[}4t1t, 121 Cal. 554 [53 P. 10!:r2J i i:'eo1'l6 v. oter7.~'tl·rg, 
111 Cal. :3 [43 1'. 19&] ; People v. B1t11.kcra, 2 CaLApr,_ l'J7 
[1>4 r. 31'4, 370J; se~ 8 Cal.Jur. l'~O.) The quef:ticno \l~letLer 
tile h\'o women present at the operati":r. were aeo."iDlplic~ of 
dde.nda~t3 was left to the jury. T1e court lllstrueto? the 
jury that Tbelm'l Huntley's testit::lOl>lY neeJe..Jwrroborntiuo 
un,ler secti .. n 1108 of the Penal Code, .. hien pruvVdeu H..tlt 
ui>On n trial for abortion the testilnt.,tJ,y of tLew."lbnn 'IV}.' 
underwent the operation ml!lSt be corrob >rato.l. The Cvurt 
refused, however, to instruct the jury tJ.IlL Thclmll HhcUUCY'S 
tel>til:J.ol!.Y needed corlobor:ttion by eVhlcn(;e fron. ",~ree 
other thaD all accomplice. Since the ().u.rt ail-i not iclpG89 
t},nt cO!J.dition, the jury was in effect lw,trllcte{i tht t~1e 
testilnony of an accomplice WaG ac~cptar.le &Ii ~orrobolati().n 
of '~1e:mll Huntley's testimony. It was therefore free to baso 
its verdict of guilty on the testimony of tll'-' t11.rac WOJl>en, 
even if it regarded 'rhellna Hlmtlcy's l!IlotJl\:lr-in-hw ll..."1d 
s:ster-in-law as accul"pliccc, proviJed that Tl"ehMHllmtlt!y 
"113 Hot herself an 1\C;t!u!nplice. The ('ourt':s refulkl t i:t.sbt1~ t 
th(> jury that 'l'!:eI::J.a II untlcy's tcstim \l.Y l\Iee.....~e.l 0 l1'i'ob •• -· 
ration. } y evidence other tha"l tc£ti1:sv,ny "'f an aco'r:a~ lk.oca.n 
theref.·,re be appro-,'cd only if we Wag n.,t &il.\. a-mi',l1~ 
The qu...stion whether a wo~:ln who SHbntits tI· an ~Ue"al 
operll:it,n is an aCf'.omplice of the defendant lin trY~l {«Ir H,e 
aLortion mud be determined accorJin!; to t!l.c dc.5nitio.n of an 
aCN!:lplicp in section 1111 of the Penal CCtde as -Inn "who is 
liable to prosecution for the identiC'll o17t:11.8e cl,llrg",..-} ~:'ll!jt 
th(> defelHb.nt on irinl." This definitiol".l. W1JJ; writtt.n id.1I the 
Ja.w by the Legislature in 1915 (Sf.,<ti;.i. 1915. p. 7CO) Pofter th:a 
C()urt, ill cOllilt.rllin~ section J 111, whkh f',)rwerly dill n· t :in-
clude Ii dennit.~un of 'lll accomplio', he~d tint accomplicell arc 
pcrs._>tH! who part~cipa.te in tbe co:mmis.,tlcn of e crime, either 
bj' c,l"I;mmitt.ing tbe a ... t Jh'uctly, 8idmg in its co::ru:llssi",n, C)~ 
adylsir.g and e!J('oarl1P'ing its commi8Sibu. . (rearle •. C •. f"J!. 
161C.1l.4~, 439 [11:1 P. 901, 39L.KA. N.3.7~J.) Un.lQr 
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this construction of the section one who cooperated in any 
manner with the defendant in committing the crime was an 
accomplice, whether or not the act uf the accomplice was a 
separate offense. This court stated, therefore, that one is an 
accomplice in the sense of section 1111 "because of what he 
had done and not because of the form of punishment which 
the law may mete out for his acts," and that "Wherever 
the law has denounced as a separate crime the particular act 
of participation by an accessory or accomplice, the sole logi-
cal and legal effect is not to destroy the relationship of ac-
complice, but merely to effect a modification of section 31. 
" (People v. Coffey, supra, p. 443.) Accordingly, a 
woman was an accomplice if she submitted to an abortion 
knowingly and cooperated with the person who performed it 
(People v. Coffey, supra, p. 446), although then as now her 
cooperation made her' punishable for the separate offense 
specified in section 275 of the Penal Code. 
In view of this construction of section 1111 as it was for-
merly worded, the Legislature added the definition of an ac-
complice to the section, repudiating the definition established 
under the former law. [1] Under the statutory definition, 
the mere fact that the witness is punishable for his cooper-
ation with the defendant in the illegal transaction does not 
make him an accomplice. It is necessary to determi.ne whether 
sections 31 and 971 of the Penal Code or other provisions of 
the criminal law subject the witness to prosecution under the 
provisions that the defendant is accused of violating, or 
whether the acts of the witness participating in the transac-
tion constitute a separate and distinct offense. [2] If a 
statutory provision so defines a crime that the participation 
of two or more persons is necessary for its commission, but 
prescribes punishment for the acts of certain participants 
only, and another statutory provision prescribes punishment 
for the acts of participants not subject to the first provision, 
it is clear that the latter are criminally liable only under the 
specific provision relating to their participation in the crim-
inal transaction. The specific provision making the acts of 
participation in the transaction a separate offense supersedes 
the general provision in section 31 of the Penal Code that 
such acts subject the participant in the crime of the ac-
cused to prosecution for its commission. (Cal. Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1859; Carpenter v. Coast Surety Corp., 25 Cal.App. 
--~--'-' --.-. ~"--,--------
Aug. 1944] PEOPLE 'V. CLAPP 
[24 C.2d 835) 
839 
2d 209, 212 [77 P.2d 294]; Imperial County v. Garey, 61 
Cal.App. 439, 444 [215 P. 89] ; Marshall v. Williams, 85 Cal. 
App. 507, 511 [259 P. 970] ; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Conti-
nental Nat. Bank, 98 Cal.App. 523,533 [277 P. 354] i Talcott 
v. Harbor Commissioners, 53 Cal. 199.) [3] Thus section 
275 of the Penal Code prescribing punishment for a woman 
who submits to an illegal operation precludes the application 
of section 31 of the Penal Code under which she would be 
punishable as principal for the crime of abortion. As the 
court stated in People v. 'Vedder, 98 N.Y. 630, 631: "The stat-
ute plainly contemplates two persons as cooperating in the 
commission of the crime, the one being the guilty person 
against whom the penalties of the statute are directed, and 
the other, the subject upon whose body the crime is com-
mitted. It then proceeds to define the respective crimes com-
mitted by the respective persons participating in the act, and 
pronounces different penalties for the respective offenses. 
It. is quite clear that the woman spoken of in the statute is 
not regarded as one of the persons who could be guilty of the 
crime described in the 294th section (abortion), and that she 
could not therefore be indicted under that section.". (See, 
also, People v. Blank, 283 N.Y. 526 [29 N.E.2d 73] i Dunnv. 
People, 29 N.Y. 523 [86 Am.Dec. 319] iState of Minnesotil'v. 
Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158 [2 N.W.2d 833, 139 A.L.R. 987] i 
1 C.J.S. 323.) For similar reasons the giver and rcceiver of 
a bribe (People v. Davis, 210 Cal. 540, 557 [293 P. 32]), and 
the perjurer and the suborner (People v.Layman, 117 Cal. 
App. 476, 479 [4 P.2d 244] ; People v. Nickell, 22 Cal.App2d 
117,124 [70 P.2d 659]) are no longer accomplices undersec-
tion 1111. (See, also, In re Morton, 179 Cal. 510, 513 [177 P. 
453] ; People v. Burness, 53 Cal.App.2d 214 [127 P.2d 623J i 
People v. Gordon, 41 Cal.App.2d 226 [106 P.2d 208] i People 
v. Williams, 7 Cal.App.2d 600 [46 P.2d 796].) Since section 
275 of the Penal Code covers all acts committed by Thelma 
Huntley in connection with the abortion, she was subject to 
prosecution for an offense distinct from the crime of abortion 
for which the defendants were on trial and was therefore not 
an accomplice within the meaning of sec-tion 1111 of the Penal 
Code. (People v. Wilson, 54 Cal.App.2d 434, 447 [129 P.2d 
149] ; see, 139 A.L.R. 993). 
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the rez:.al Code relates to the testimony of any woman on 
wh(,m an abortion was performed, whether she voluntarily 
. subl!litteJ to the operation or was induced to do Sf) by force 
or fraull. The section is designed to protect the defendant 
agaiz:.st possible injustice where his statement and that of the 
woman conflict. (See, 7 Wigmore, Evidence [1940], § 2061, 
, p. 346.) Since this section has no bearing on the question 
. whether the woman is an accomplice, its requircment of cor-
, roborating testimony cannot be cor.strued as excluding the 
testimony of an accomplice for the corroboration of the 
woman's testimony. 
The judgments and order appealed from are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUGR, J.-I dissent. I agree with the statement in 
the majvrity opinion that "The <.;.uestion whether a woman 
who submits to an illegal operation is an accomplice <.of the 
defendant on trial for the ahortion must bc deter~ined ac-
cor~ing to the definition of au acconplice in section 1111 of 
the Penal Codc as one 'who is liable to prosecution for the 
identical offense charged against the defendant on trial.' " 
But I submit that in any particular case thc answer to that 
question must depend upon the facts of that casco The ma-
jority opinion declares also that "Ul~der the statutory defini-
tion. the nierc fact that the witness is punishable for his co-
operation with the llcfendant in the illegal transaction does 
not make hio an accomplice." In an acade::lic sense this 
.' statement is true. But it is also true that, under the law (.f 
California as it has heretofore been gencrally understood and 
applied, if the coopcration of the witness made hir.l liable to 
prosecution f(Jr the illelltical offense chargeJ against the de-
fendant then such witness was an accomplice and the fact 
that he m.ight alsv be llaMe to prusecution for a separate 
c.ffense arisi:l.g out of the same acts d~d not abrogate his status 
as an accomplice. Certainly it should not be deer:1ed to re-
store his character a::J.d integrity as a witness. 
The maj<>rity opinion continues, "It is necessary to deter-
mine whether sections 31 and 971 of the Penal Code or other 
provisions of the criminal law subject the witness to prose-
Aug. 19M] . PEOPLtC tI. CLAP!' 
[24 C.2d 835]., 
841~ 
cution under the provisions that the defendant is accused of, 
violating, or whether the acts of tho witness partieipating 
in the transaction constitute a separate and distinct offense. ", 
(Italics added.) This statement is to be noted for its use of 
the disjunctive "or." As I view the law the evidence' hex:e 
establishes that the witness under discussion was liable to, 
prosecution under the provisions that the defendann; are ae-, 
cused of violating and that her acts constituted a separnte and 
distinct offense. The majority opinion, however, asserts the 
following propositions and conclusion: "If a statutory pro-
vision so defines a crime that the participation of two or more 
persons is necessary for its commission, but prescribes pun-
ishment for the acts of certain participants only, and another 
statutory provision prescribes punishment for the acts of 
participants not subject to the first provision, it is clear that 
the latter are criminally liable only under the specific provi-
sion relating to their participation in tht. eriminal trans-
action. The specific provision making the acts of partici. 
pation in the transaction a separate offense supersedes tho 
general provision in section 31 of the PenaZ Code that such 
acts subject the participant in the crime of the acC1tsed to 
prosecution for its commission. [Citing Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 1859, and civil cases.] Thus section 275 of the Penal Code' 
prescribing punishment for a woman who submits to an illel=al 
operation precludes the application of section 31 of the Penal 
Code under which she would be punishable as principal for 
the crime of abortion." (Italics added.) , 
I am unable to agree with either of the two last quoted 
propositions or the conclusion. As is hereinafter pointed out 
in more detail, section 275 of the Penal Code seems to be de-
signed to cover explicitly certain situations which are not 
covered by section 274 rathcr than to excuse from guilt of 
violation of the last mentioned section one who by the clear 
language' of sections 31 and 971 is guilty of violating it. 
It does not clearly appear to me what implications are 
intended by the above quoted language "If a statutory pro-
vision so defines a crime that the pariic·ipation of two or mQre 
persons is necessary for its commission," ctc. Certainly there 
is nothing in section 274 of the Penal Code upon which to 
base an assumption that "the [unlawful] participation of 
two or more persons ~Q necessary" for the comuUssion of 
acts violating it. One per-<:on acting independcntly just as 
/ 
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well 88 two or more acting in cooperation can violate that 
section. The victim may be wholly unaware that the purpose 
of a drug administered to, or an operation performed upon, 
her is to produce an abortion. Under such circumstances she 
would not be an accomplice but this would be true because 
the facts proved did not bring her within the provisions of 
section 31 of the Penal Code. The victim in such a case no 
more "participates" in the crime than does the victim of 
a murder, forcible rape, robbery, mayhem, or kidnaping-. 
Certainly it would be true that if the participation of a 
witness constituted exclusively a separate offense he would 
not be an accomplice of the defendant, but it seems equally 
obvious that if his participation were such as to make him 
liable to prosecution for both the defendant's offense and a 
separate offense he would irrefragably be an accomplice of 
the defendant insofar as his competency as a witness in the 
prosecution of the defendant is concerned. The mere fact 
that the law created an additional offense as to him, whether 
overlapping or not, for which he might or might not be prose-
cuted, would not change the legal character of his relation-
ship to the defendant and the latter's crime. 
The "principals" in a crime are defined in section 31 of 
the Penal Code: "All persons concerned in the commission 
of a crime . . . whether they directly commit the act con-
stituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, 
not being present, have advised and encouraged its commis-
sion . . . are principals in any crime so committed." (Italics 
added.) . In the same tenor section 971 of the Penal Code 
provides that "The distinction between an accessory before 
the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first 
and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all 
persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether 
they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid 
and abet in its commission . . . shall hereafter be prosecuted, 
tried, and punished as principals. . . ." (Italics added.) 
Furthermore, contemplating apparently just such a situation 
88 that which appears in this case; viz., one in which the 
same act may violate more than one statute, the Legislature 
enacted scction 654· of the Penal Code, protecting the offender 
against double punishment by the provision that "An act 
or omission which is made punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of this code may be punished under either 
of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under 
more than one." (Italics !ldded.) 
Aug.1944] . PEoPLE v. CLAPP 
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Sections 1111 and 31 of the Penal Code, being parts of 
the same code dealing with related subject matter, must be 
read together. Section 1111 defines an accomplice "as one 
who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged 
against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testi. 
mony of the accomplice is given." Section 31. specifies the 
persons who are "liable to prosecution for the identical of· 
fense charged against the defendant." It specifically declares 
that" A.ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, 
whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they di-
rectly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet 
in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and 
encouraged its commission . . . are principals in any crimes 
so committed." (Italics added.) It is difficult to conceive of 
clearer language than that used in section 31. Under its 
language no one but a principal "liable to prosecution for 
the identical offense charged against the defendant" can be 
an accomplice. 
The object of the Legislature in this enactment was both 
to simplify criminal procedure and to abolish the technicali. 
ties of the common law which made the aider or abettor a 
principal in the second degree and which forbade bringing 
the accessory to trial until the principal had been convicted 
or outlawed. (See 2 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, 232.) 
At the same time the Legislature recognized that the "evi· 
dence of an accomplice, coming • from a tainted source, the 
witness being, first, an infamous man, from his' own confes-
sion of guilt, and, second, a man usually testifying in the 
hope of favor or the expectation of immunity, was not .en· 
titled to the same consideration as the evidence ofa clean 
man" (People v. Coffey (1911), 161 Cal. 433, 438 [119 P. 
901, 39 L.R.A. N.S; 704]) and declared the policy of the 
state that "A conviction cannot be :had upon the testimony 
of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such otherevi~ 
dence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the com. 
mission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient 
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the cir. 
cumstances thereof." (Pen. Code, § 1111.) The definition. 
of the word "accomplice" in section 1111 does not purport 
to repudiate the provisions of section 31 but is, rather, de-
pendent upon that section for definite intelligibility. Section 
31 was enacted in 1872 and the Legislature certainly must be 
presumed to have had the provisions of that section in mind 
844 PEOPLE V. CLAPP [24 C.2d 
when it, in 1915, amcndeJ the related section, 1111, to define 
the wurd "accolIlplice," and used language which is made 
certain and definite in it'> application to the subject matter 
by reference to the earlier section. 
There is a seemin~ Hug/lestion in th·J majority opinion that 
it "as been use of some amendment in the law wroul~ht by 
the l:mguage or the definition of accomplice in section 1111 
that it was held in certain cases that a thief was not the ac-
complice of the receiver of his stolen property. I do not 
perceive thtlt the language of the definition of accomplice as 
set forth in I<cction 1111 of the Penal Code repeals or modifieM 
in any way the provisions of gection 31 of the same coue. No 
Iluthority ha\; been called to my attention which disputes the 
proposition that "every person of legal responsibility, who 
knowin{;ly nnd voluntarily co-operates with or aids or a8si£1..':I 
or adyise3 or encourages another in the commission or a crime 
j~ Ilt! IlcCUL."l}Jlicc." (P,;u'j.d.; v. Caffe',!! (1911), s·u1Jra. at pp . .,1.39-
410.) As long as sections 31 and 1111 rem:lin, in their pr('sent 
form, :'IS p~rts of the Penal Code, just so long do " All persons 
eonc~rned ill the cOlllmission of a crime . . . whether they 
directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and 
auct in its commission, or, not being present, haye advi'lcd 
alld encouraged its commission," remain accomplices. They 
remain accolllplices because by the effect of section 31 t~ey 
:irc "liaule tu }Jrosecutioll for the identical ()lrensc [propC'rly] 
ehnrgcu r.gdnst" any of their number arising out of th~ir 
joint undertaking. 
'1'11e majority opinion cites certain cases concerned 'with 
briuery, perjury, and receiving stolen property as sapporting 
the vicw promulgated. It would require unwurranteu c::tcnt 
in this dissenting opinion to analyze each of those case'S or 
eyen each of the types of crime mentioned. It is obvious that 
nOlle of those cases constitutes actual authority for the pru}Jo· 
I'itions or conclusion enunciated by the majority hcre. In my 
opinion it is impraeticel to lay down a broad rulo which may 
pro';, lerly determine in every case, regar(Uess of varying fac-
tuul details, whether a woman is or is not the accomplice of 
a doctor who abort'> her. Each case presf:'llts inherently a 
question of fact and should be governed not by a rulo of 
thumb which the courts may declare but by the applicable 
provisions of the Penal Code under the facts of the particuhtr 
case. The same rule should apply in all types of crime. For 
example we lllay take the crime of receidng stolen property. 
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Certainly it is true that a receiver of stolen property is' not 
the accomplice of the thief in the commission ot the theft if 
that theft has been completely committed before the receiver 
of the property is contacted by the thief. This is obviously 
true not because of any court-made rule of law to the effect 
that the receiver of stolen property cannot. be an accomplice 
of the thief but because the receiver in such a case does not 
factually come within the definition of accomplice. He has 
not committed the theft directly nor has he. aided, abetted, 
advised, or encouraged its commission. Hence, under sections 
31 and 1111 he is not an accomplice. But I submit that if a 
person, in advance of the commission of a theft, were to wil-
fully advise and encourage another to commit it, agreeing to 
purchase and receive the specific property to be stolen, then 
such person so advising and encouraging the theft should be 
held guilty of the theft itself, as an accomplice, even though 
he might also, upon actual receipt of the. property, be guilty 
of the separate offense of receiving stolen property. But the 
majority rule here, if followed, will exculpate him from guilt 
of theft. So also the thief mayor may not, dependent upon 
the facts of each particular case, be an accomplice of the 
receiver of stolen property. Merely because he has stolen the 
property and sold it, he is not necessarily an accomplice of 
the receiver in violating section 496 of the Penal Code. That 
section makes a specific intent a part of the offense denounced. 
It declares that "Every person who for his own gain, or to 
prevent the owner from again possessing his property, buys 
or receives any personal property, knowing the same to have 
been stolen . . . is punishable," etc. (Italics added.) A 
thief, having the stolen property in his possession, normally 
is interested in only one thing; viz., to dispose of it for his 
own personal gain. The realization of gain for himself is the 
controlling motive for his every action. In selling the property 
to another his interel!lt in the transaction MMeil when it is sold, 
delivered, and paid for. He would ordinarily have no inter-
est whatsoever in aiding or abetting the receiver to receive, 
hold, or handle the property for the latter's gain or to "pre-
vent the owner from again possessing his property." Hence, 
there is a rational ground for holding that the thief would 
not, upon the facts, merely by reMon of the sale of the stolen 
property to another, aid or abet the latter in his separate 
offense. Again, however, the question is inherently one of 
fact rather than of law. 
·' 
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So in this case it is primarily a question of fact'whether 
the witness 'l'helma Huntley was an accomplice. If she did 
not know that an abortion was to be committed upon her, or, 
knowing it was proposed, did not wilfully cooperate in or 
encourage it, she would not be an accomplice. But if, with 
full knowledge, she aided, abetted, advised, or encouraged 
the defendants to violate section 274 of the Penal Code then 
she is an accomplice and, by the express terms of section 31, 
a principal in this case. The fact that she may also have 
violated section 275 of the same code does not absolve her 
from guilt for violation of section 274 nor can it alter the 
facts which constitute her an accomplice and principal 
therein. The sections do, to some extent, overlap but, as 
previously suggested, section 275 seems obviously intended 
to cover situations which are not covered by section 274, 
rather than, as held by the majority, to eXCUlpate her from 
guilt as a principal for violation of section 274 when she 
dcliberately aids, abets, and encourages another to participate 
in violating the section. Section 275 makes guilty of the of-
fense there defined any "woman who solicits of any person 
any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, and takes the 
same, or who submits . . . to the use of any means whatever, 
with the intent thereby to procure a miscarriage, unless the 
same is necessary to preserve her life." The solicitation or 
submission referred to in this section might take place with 
the essential guilty intent on the part of the woman but en-
tirely without any guilty knowledge on the part of the person 
solicited. This, then, would constitute an offense entirely 
separate from that defined in section 274, but it obviously 
does not preclude the woman from aiding and abetting some-
one else in the violation of section 274. 
Some of the mischief in the broad doctrine of the majority 
that" The specific provision making the acts of participation 
in the transaction a separate offense supersedes the general 
provision in section 31 of the Penal Code that such acts sub-
ject the participant in the crime of the accused to prosecution 
for its commission," may be shown by illustration. With that 
doctrine in mind let us considcr some of the situations which 
may arise under section 653f of the Penal Code. That section 
provides that ., Every person who solicits another to offer or 
accept or join in the offer or acceptance of a bribe, or to com-
mit or join in the commission of murder, robbery, burglary, 
grand theft, receiving stolen property, extortion, rape by 
force and violence, perjury, subornation of perjury,' forgery, 
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or kidnaping, is punishable by imprisonment in the county 
jail not longer than one year or in the state prison not longer 
than five years, or by fine of not more than five thousand 
dollars. " The advantage to the leader of an organized gang 
of criminals is obvious. If he personally remained aloof from 
direct and personal participation in the crimes he solicited 
his men to commit his liability to prosecution under section 
653£ would, in the language of the majority, "preclude the 
application of section 31 of the Penal Code" under which, 
as the law has heretofore been understood, he would have been 
liable as a principal for the crime actually committed, and he 
would instead be subject only to the relatively light punish-
ment prescribed by section 653f. That advantage to him could 
be substantial not only as to major crimes of violence but 
even as to the relatively minor offense of receiving stolen 
property. That offense (Pen. Code, § 496bb) is declared to 
be a felony and is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison not exceeding five years (Pen. Code, § 18). But under 
section 653f he might be only fined or given a county jail 
sentence. 
The Legislature in this state has declared the policy that 
accomplices must be corroborated if a conviction on their 
tel!timony is to be sustained. That requirement reflects the 
wisdom of lawmakers based on the experiences of mankind 
over the centuries during which penal laws have been enacted 
and administered. As stated in People v. Ooffey (1911), supra, 
161 Cal. 433, 438, "Time has not changed the value of such 
evidence." If exemptions in such laws (as to the corrobo-
ration of accomplices) are to be created, they should come 
from the Legislature and not be innovated by the courts. This 
court should be ever vigilant to protect, rather than to whittle 
away, the safeguards which the people through the Legisla-
ture have thrown around their liberty. However righteous 
the zeal to punish the guilty, the result of a salutary law 
struck down may well be more unrighteous than for two (or 
any number of) guilty individuals to escape punishment for 
a particular offense. 
. Upon the evidence in this case it seems cert.ain that if the 
defendants are guilty of the offense charged, then so also is 
the witness Thelma Huntley guilty of such offense. 
The trial court erred in railing to properly instruct the 
jury as to the necessity for corroboration of the witness and 
the judgments and order appealed from should be reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
'. :~~ 
